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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND
IDENTIFICATION
RULE 901: REQUIREMENT OF
AUTHENTICATION OR IDENTIFICATION
Federal Rule of Evidence 901 provides:
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation, the following are examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a
matter is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to
the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not
acquired for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the
trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have
been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance,
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission
or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any
time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by
evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time
by the telephone company to a particular person or business, if
(A) in the case of a person, circumstances, including selfidentification, show the person answering to be the one called, or
(B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of
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business and the conversation related to business reasonably
transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or
filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public
office where items of this nature are kept.
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a
document or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such
condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity,
(B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C)
has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system
used to produce a result and showing that the process or system
produces an accurate result.
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of
authentication or identification provided by Act of Congress or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority. 1
Rule 901 provides the basis for the authentication or
identification of non-testimonial evidence as a precondition to its

admissibility, and is another aspect of relevancy. 2 The proponent
of such evidence must lay a foundation of genuineness sufficient
3
to support a finding of authenticity by the trier of fact.

1. FED. R. Evm. 901.
2. FED. R. EvID. 90f(a) advisory committee's note. The advisory
committee's note states that "[b]ecause this requirement is within the category
of conditional relevancy, dependent upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact,
[it] is governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b)." Id.; FED. R. EVID.
104(b). Rule 104(b) provides: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject
to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment
of the condition." Id.
3. See generally 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2129, 2130 (3d ed. 1940);
see also United States v. Sutton, 426 F.2d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(stating that documentary evidence must be established as genuine before it
may be admitted into evidence).
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The Second Circuit has examined Rule 901 in several cases,
stating that "[ajuthentication is perhaps the purest example of a
rule respecting relevance: evidence admitted as something can
have no probative value unless that is what it really is." 4 The

Second Circuit has indicated that the burden of proof in issues of
authentication rests with the party seeking admission of the
evidence. 5 In United States v. Hon,6 the court stated that Rule

901 "requires that to meet the admissibility threshold the [party
seeking admission] need only prove a rational basis for
concluding that an exhibit is what it is claimed to be." 7 Similarly,
in United States v. Natale,8 the court stated that under Rule
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of authentication prior to the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Brandon v. Collins, 267
F.2d 731 (1959). In Brandon, the court addressed the issue of whether certain
claimants should have received death benefits. Id. at 732-733. The court found
that a beneficiary card, which was used to establish the identity of the
beneficiary appointed by the deceased, was properly admitted. Id. The court
held that the judge properly found the beneficiary card genuine by comparing it
to an authentic signature on the decedent's previous separation agreement. Id.
at 732-33. The court held that visual comparisons sufficiently satisfied
preliminary authentication requirements for admission in evidence. Id. As
support for its holding, the court quoted from the language of the controlling
statute: "The admitted or proved handwriting of any person shall be
admissible, for purposes of comparison, to determine genuineness of other
handwriting attributed to such person." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1731
(YEAR)) (footnote omitted).
4. United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 499 (1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1058 (1985).
5. See United States v. Almonte, 956 F.2d 27, 30 (1992) (finding that
attorney's notes were not an accurate statement of the witness' own words and,
therefore, unable to be authenticated).
6. 904 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991). In a
prosecution for trafficking in stolen watches, defendant contended that the
government's "chain of custody" proof was insufficient to allow various
counterfeit watches into evidence. Id. at 809.
7. Id. at 809.
8. 526 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976). The
defendants, charged with conspiracy and extortion as a means to collect
extensions of credit, argued that admission of a notebook containing numerous
records of such transactions was improper. Id. at 1173. The court held that
because the defendants were present at the time of seizure, the notebook
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901(a) a proponent "need only prove a rational basis from which
the jury may conclude that the exhibit did, in fact, belong to the
appellants." 9 The court has held that this rational basis may be
established by a witness who testifies that he is personally
familiar with the exhibits. 10 In United States v. Almonte, 11 the

court found that debriefing notes, written by an assistant United
States attorney, did not reflect the witness' own words and were,
therefore, inadmissible. 12 The court stated that the party seeking
admission of the notes would bear the burden of proof in showing
that the notes contained the witness' own thoughts. 13 In reaching
this conclusion, the court applied the rational basis test as set
14
forth in Hon and Natale.
However, the Second Circuit has recognized that Rule 901
"does not definitely establish the nature or quantum of proof that
is required."

15

Thus, in United States v. Kahn, 16 the court

contained numerous incriminating records, and that the notebook was found in
an office frequently used by the defendants, there were sufficient facts to
establish authenticity. Id.
9. Id. at 1173.
10. United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1994). The defendant
was convicted of making a false statement to the United States Probation
Office, and alleged error because the government was allowed to introduce his
monthly probation reports, without specifically linking the reports to him. Id.
at 86-87. The court held that since the Deputy Chief Probation Officer testified
that he was personally familiar with the defendant and specifically connected
the probation reports to him, "noting they had been retrieved from
[defendant's] file," this testimony warranted the submission of the reports to
the jury. Id. at 90.
11. 956 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 30.
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 30.
15. Ricketts v. City of Hartford, No. 94-7422, 1996 WL 21170, at *12
(Jan. 17, 1996) (stating that "'[i]dentification of a voice, whether heard
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic recording,' can be established
'by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances
connecting it to the alleged speaker.'") (citations omitted).
16. 53 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 697 (1996). The
defendants, charged with mail fraud and conspiring to defraud the New York
State Medicaid system, argued that the admission of two telephone calls to the
Department of Social Services into evidence was improper. Id. at 515. The
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indicated that surrounding circumstances could provide a basis

for authenticating the identity of a telephone caller. 17
New York evidence law follows a similar approach to that of
Rule 901 and "generally requires that the proponent of evidence

prove authenticity as a condition to the admission of the
evidence." 18 New York case law concerning authentication
provides various illustrations which conform with the general
rule of authentication. 19 For example, New York courts have
upheld the authentication of handwriting comparisons made by

lay witnesses. 20 In People v. Molineux,2 1 the court of appeals
held that genuineness of a handwriting sample can be established

court held that "[w]hile a mere assertion of identity by a person talking on the
telephone is not itself sufficient to authenticate that person's identity, some
additional evidence, which 'need not fall in[to] any set pattern,' may provide
the necessary foundation." Id. at 516 (citing FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(6) advisory
committee's note).
17. Id. at 516.
18. See

RANDOLPH

N.

JONAKArr ET AL.,

NEW' YORK EviDENTiARY

45 (1993). When "relevance depends on the existence of some
other fact" the same analysis would apply to both proving authenticity and to
establishing relevance. Id. Furthermore, in determining the sufficiency of
evidence, the trial judge will ask if there is "sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to conclude that the evidence is what its proponent claims it is
FOUNDATIONs

.".Id.

19. See People v. Dunbar Contracting Co., 215 N.Y. 416, 109 N.E. 554
(1915) (holding that a person's voice can be identified by a witness having
some familiarity with the voice); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 320-21,
61 N.E. 286, 304-05 (1901) (holding that a lay witness may identify
handwriting with which the witness is familiar).
20. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4536 (McKinney 1992). Section 4536
provides that "[c]omparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to
the satisfaction of the court to be the handwriting of the person claimed to have
made the disputed writing shall be permitted." Id., see also People v.
Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 324, 61 N.E. 286, 305-06 (1901) (stating that a
"disputed writing" may be any writing which a person "seeks to prove as the
genuine handwriting of any person" and that such evidence will be admissible
as long as it is not inadmissible under any other rules of evidence). Id. at 324,
61 N.E. at 306.
21. 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
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by testimony of a witness who is familiar with the author. 22 In
addition, New York law recognizes that circumstantial evidence
23
may serve to authenticate or identify the proffered evidence.

Moreover, custodians of public records may testify to the
authenticity of such records. 24 Finally, stipulation by the adverse

party, as well as actual observation of the creation of the writing
25
are also acceptable methods of authentication in New York.
Although Rule 901 and New York law take similar approaches

to authentication, there are two significant differences. First, with
respect

to

901(b)(6)(A)

authenticating

states

that

telephone

conversations,

self-identification

is

Rule

sufficient

26
identification of one to whom a telephone call was placed.

However, self-identification on the telephone is more restrictive
under New York evidentiary rules than Rule 901(b)(6). 27 New
York requires more than mere self-identification where the voice
is unrecognizable to the caller. 28 Although the courts have not

specified what "more than mere self identification" consists of, it
has been stated that other circumstantial evidence may be needed
to prove the identification. 2 9 In addition, the New York rule

22. Id. at 328, 61 N.E. at 307.

23. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 225, at 695 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
3d ed. 1984) (stating that circumstantial evidence may consist of evidence that
a person has knowledge of facts which would only be known by the alleged
signer of the writing or receipt of a reply letter).
24. See JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 644, at 641-42
(10th ed. 1973) (stating that in order to authenticate a document various
alternative means may be used such as testimony from the proper custodian or
proof of removal from the care of an official custodian).
25. Molineux, 168 N.Y. at 328, 61 N.E. at 307.
26. See FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(6)(A).
27. See Mankes v. Fishman, 163 A.D. 789, 795-96, 149 N.Y.S.2d 228,
232-33 (3d Dep't 1914). In Mankes, the court held that the identity of a person
answering the telephone can be proven using methods other than voice
recognition and, similarly, a conversation which is otherwise admissible may
be entered into evidence "when from all the circumstances the identity of the
person answering the telephone has been established with reasonable
certainty." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Mankes court stated that:
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distinguishes personal calls from business calls, allowing greater
latitude
for
self-identification
in business
telephone
.30
conversations
Second, there is a difference between federal and New York

law concerning the time period during which an ancient
document can be authenticated and admitted into evidence. Under
Rule 901(b)(8)(C), the document must be "in existence [for] 20
years or more at the time it is offered." 3 1 In New York, the
ancient document rule requires a period of thirty years. 32

[The identity of a person speaking through a telephone may be
established, not alone by the sound of his voice, but from other
circumstances as well; as from the fact that he appeared at the telephone
in response to a call for a person by his name at a place where he had
been located as being, admitted that such was his name, and was
familiar with the transactions inquired about ....
Id. at 796, 149 N.Y.S.2d at 223 (citing Cox v. Cline, 126 N.W. 330 (Iowa
Sup. Ct. 1910)).
30. See People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 401 N.E.2d 405, 425 N.Y.S.2d
295 (1980) (holding that in business situations self-identification without
additional circumstantial evidence may be acceptable).
31. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8)(C).
32. See Tillman v. Lincoln Warehouse Corp., 72 A.D.2d 40, 44, 423
N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (1st Dep't 1979) (stating that pursuant to "the 'ancient
document' rule a record or document which is found to be more than thirty
years of age and which is proven to have come from proper custody and is
itself free from any indication of fraud or invalidity 'proves itself'").
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